As the title of her book indicates, Emma Borg is a minimalist with regard to semantics and, like many minimalists, sees herself as defending her patch from the encroachments of the 'contextualist hoards'. She is, therefore, taking up a particular position within what is seen by many philosophers of language as a foundational debate concerning the true bearers of semantic (truth-conditional) content. According to the minimalist (or 'literalist'), natural language sentences represent the world as being a certain way and are true or false depending on how the world is. The contextualist maintains that this is a category mistake, that it is utterances or speech acts that have such content and, whatever semantic properties sentences have, it is only in conjunction with the non-linguistic information in contexts of utterance that they eventuate in truth-conditional content. In other words, minimalists believe that there is a formally-driven, pragmatics-free level of semantic content, while contextualists believe that there is no level of semantic content without quite extensive pragmatic input. Viewed this way it certainly sounds like a substantive debate.
2 Borg and most current minimalists agree on, the debate reduces to a disagreement about the nature of sentence-type meaning, effectively the issue of just how minimal it is. Somewhat ironically, it is the contextualist who tends to go for the most minimalist treatment of sentence meaning -as subpropositional, a mere propositional radical, a schema or template for pragmatically building propositions -while the semantic minimalist insists that it is fully propositional, albeit seldom constituting the content of what the speaker said, which has to be constructed pragmatically on its basis. Either way, the essentials of the big pragmatic or contextualist picture of human verbal communication are preserved: linguistic expressiontype meaning underdetermines not only the full communicative import of an utterance but more specifically what a speaker says, what she communicates explicitly. It is one of the many virtues of this beautifully written and carefully argued book that this point emerges with perfect clarity.
Two things distinguish Emma Borg's minimalist semantics from other recent manifestations of the same general persuasion: (a) its rigour, and (b) its cognitive-scientific credentials.
Borg insists that semantics is a wholly formal enterprise and her aim is to 'show that there is a level of semantic content which can be recovered simply on the basis of the formal [syntactic] features of the expressions produced together with a formal description of the context in which they are uttered without any appeal to the use to which the speaker is putting those expressions (specifically, without any appeal to her mental, or intentional, states) ' (p.33) . She is thorough-going about this, not taking the easy way out of making an exception for that bag of tricky, inherently context-dependent expressions (indexicals, demonstratives, etc.) and letting speaker intentions in to determine their semantic content (as do, for instance, Cappelen & Lepore (2005) within their 'insensitive' semantics). This is reinforced by her adoption of the Fodorian view of the language faculty as a modular mechanism, incorporating as one of its components a formal semantic theory. As such, the processes responsible for delivering the semantic content of any given sentence take as their only input a syntactic description of the sentence (and perhaps a formal description of objective features of context); specifically, they are insulated (encapsulated) from the hearer's general knowledge and his appreciation of the wider nonlinguistic context, including beliefs he may have about the speaker's communicative intentions or expectations of rational communicative behaviour (that it should be appropriately relevant and informative, etc). The latter are the domain of a distinct central system of (defeasible) pragmatic inference. As she argues convincingly, the formal semantic enterprise and the modular view of language processing mesh very well together ('a match made in heaven' (p. 8)). The domain-specificity and informational encapsulation characteristic of modular mental systems ensure their speedy operation but at the cost of a quite 'shallow output', an output that usually has to be corrected or elaborated by other 'higher-level' processes of the central cognitive system. Given the somewhat deflationary interpretation of the minimalism/contextualism debate I gave above, the question here is 'how shallow is the output of the language module?' Borg takes it to be a complete proposition, a thought, a truth-evaluable entity, a claim about the world, while relevance theorists, who have also espoused both a formal ('decoding') and modular view of semantics from the outset (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/95) , take it to be something shallower: a not fully propositional schema which, given the other resources at his cognitive disposal, is all a hearer needs in figuring out what claim(s) the speaker is making.
After the first two chapters in which Borg lays out her formalist semantic commitments and the modular architecture within which the philosophical stance is given cognitive flesh, she proceeds in the next two chapters to confront the challenges presented by demonstratives and other overtly context-sensitive expressions and by apparent instances of covert contextsensitivity (such as the unpronounced location constituent in an utterance of 'It is raining').
Her aim here is, as she puts it, employing a not entirely optimistic image, 'to preserve a sand- Especially valuable, and highly relevant to the debate at hand, is a section entitled 'The semantic relevance of "what is said"' (p.110) where she discusses and puts to rest (hopefully forever) the idea that a semantic theory is required to deliver for any sentence s the content p, where for a speaker S who utters s, 'S said that p' is a correct indirect report. As she argues, However, in the midst of all this meticulous and thoughtful discussion, Borg makes one initially surprising slip -in her characterization of the Gricean notion of conventional implicature (p. 131). This comes towards the end of the modularity chapter where she is wondering whether there are aspects of linguistic meaning which do not fall clearly in either the formal semantic module or the speaker-intention-sensitive system of pragmatic interpretation. She attributes to Grice as an example of a conventional implicature the implication of temporal sequence that is understood for many utterances of sentential conjunctions, e.g. 'John got made redundant and took his employers to court' is standardly understood as not equivalent to 'John took his employers to court and got made redundant', although 'and' is taken to be semantically identical to the truth-functional operator '&'. But for Grice, this was a case of a (generalized) conversational implicature, derived on the basis of one of his conversational maxims of manner: 'Be orderly'. It has all the usual characteristics of conversational implicatures (whether generalized or particularized); in particular, it is calculable (derivable through a process of pragmatic reasoning) and cancellable without semantic contradiction. This distinguishes it from the examples of conventional implicature that Grice did discuss, such as the conventional expression-type meaning of connectives like 'but', 'moreover', 'on the other hand', whose meaning does not depend on any conversational maxim or reasoning process (it is, as the label suggests, conventional or encoded) and cannot be cancelled without significant semantic anomaly.
As Grice says, 'it is all too easy to treat a generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature' (Grice 1989, 37) and that is what Borg does. In fact, she collapses the distinction altogether in her discussion of how to treat the class of 'generalized/ conventional' implicature and suggests, following Levinson's (2000) account of generalized conversational implicatures, that this phenomenon constitutes a third kind of meaning (not really semantic and not really pragmatic), based on 'general expectations about how language is normally used', and occupying a 'grey area between literal sentence meaning and speaker meaning' (p.133). Well, whatever the outcome of the current hive of industry surrounding the proper treatment of the alleged class of 'generalized' conversational implicature, it seems perfectly clear that the conventional meaning of words like 'but', 'moreover', 'anyway', 'yet', 'still', 'after all', etc., though generally agreed not to contribute to the truth-conditional content of a sentence/utterance, belongs fair and square within that subcomponent of the semantic component of a language module that records the standing lexical meaning of words. The worry here is that this isn't just a slip-up in the choice of example (in which case I would be making too much of it), but that it is a misconception born out of Borg's vehement commitment to a view of linguistic semantics as wholly a matter of truth conditions. On that mind set, what lexical meaning must do is feed the deductive semantic machine, so there can be no role here for the non-truth-conditional meaning encoded by words like 'but' and 'anyway' and so it is hustled off the scene, out of the language faculty. On the relevance theory view, which is equally modular in its linguistic semantics but which harbours no assumption that all linguistic meaning is geared to a truth-conditional output, the encoded meaning of these words (and a range of non-canonical syntactic structures) is analyzed as providing directives concerning pragmatic processing, that is, as semantic constraints on the post-modular inferential phase of utterance comprehension (Blakemore 1987, Carston forthcoming).
The most pressing issue for the rigorous minimalist is how such a speaker-intentioneschewing propositional semantics can accommodate overtly context-dependent expressions.
Borg confronts this head-on in the central chapter of her book and makes what is, I think, the strongest case yet for treating indexical and demonstrative content in an entirely formal (nonpragmatic) way, thus shoring up the semantic sand-castle just where it seems at its most 6 vulnerable to the pragmatic waves. (I don't think the questions around 'unarticulated constituents', discussed at length in chapter 4, are a central concern, since both she and the contextualists view these as arising, if at all, at the level of 'what is said', not linguistic expression-type meaning from which they are precluded virtually by definition.) Faced with indexicality, the usual move for a formal theorist is to recognise that her semantic analyses must be taken to apply not to sentence-types per se but to sentence-types relativized to a context of utterance. In order to comply with the formalist programme (and the stringencies of the modular approach to linguistic comprehension that Borg takes), the kind of context appealed to must be describable in entirely formal terms, without any recourse to speaker intentions concerning who or what is being referred to. So it has to consist of a set of objectively determined parameters like speaker, time and place of utterance, and perhaps demonstrated objects. But, while this may be fine for some purely formal logical investigations, it seems wholly inadequate for semantic analyses which are intended to reflect speaker-hearer's cognitive processes and to play a role in an account of verbal communication (see Predelli (2005) on this point). In utterance comprehension, identifying the referents of demonstatives like 'this', 'that', 'she', 'he', 'it', 'then', 'there', etc. is clearly a pragmatic matter, requiring consideration of speaker intentions, but even so-called 'pure indexicals' like 'here', 'now', 'tomorrow', 'you', 'we' and perhaps 'I' are often intention-dependent. The problem for the formal modular truth-conditionalist seems formidable.
Borg's proposed solution has two parts to it. First, in order to accommodate the 'character' of indexicals and demonstratives, that is, their context-independent standing meaning (e.g. roughly, that 'I' refers to the person who speaks it, that 'that' refers to a demonstrated object at some relatively large proximal distance from the speaker, etc), which does not surface in the actual truth-conditional content of sentences in which these expressions are constituents, she adopts the conditionalized T-statement approach of Higginbotham (1988) . So the output of the semantic theory for sentences containing overtly context-sensitive expressions is theorems of the following sort:
If the speaker of 'this is red' refers with the utterance of 'this' therein to x and to nothing else, then that utterance is true if and only if x is red.
If the speaker S of 'that book is mine' refers with the utterance of 'that book' to x and x is a book, then that utterance is true if and only if x is S's.
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What this approach does is accommodate the obvious fact that our semantic knowledge includes the encoded lexical meaning of demonstratives and indexicals, without compromising the basic truth-conditional programme; it ensures that the objects appearing in the truth condition (on the right hand side of the biconditional consequent of the conditional) have the property imposed by the referring expression while steering clear of the actual (pragmatic, intention-sensitive) process of identifying that referent.
The second (and innovative) part of Borg's story is her idea that each tokening of a demonstrative or indexical syntactically triggers the creation of a singular concept which is its semantic content. A singular concept (as opposed to a general concept) is one that refers directly to (has as its content) an object, but figuring out who or what that object is standardly requires consideration of speaker intentions and so is a task that lies beyond the remit of the formal semantic processor. According to this account, what we grasp when we understand an utterance of 'That's mine' is a proposition or thought of the shape [∀ is ∃'s] where '∀' and '∃' are singular concepts. Each comes with a further bit of information along the lines that '∀' is a THAT concept while '∃' is a SPEAKER concept, information provided by the (non-truthconditional) semantic character of the linguistic expressions, which functions as a constraint on how the concepts are subsequently integrated with other language-module-external information (from perception or memory), specifically in the pragmatic process of identifying the entity the speaker is referring to. So the proposal is importantly distinct from John Perry's 'reflexive proposition' in which indexical character features as a constituent and which is considered by many to be an insufficiently substantial kind of propositionality to qualify as semantic content (see Recanati 2006, 77) . On Borg's account, the semantic content of an indexical/demonstrative is, in effect, character under a Kaplanian 'dthat' operator, so the singular proposition [∀ belongs to ∃] expressed by an utterance u of 'That's mine' is equivalent to [dthat(salient object) belongs to dthat(speaker of u)].
I find this a very appealing account since it is not only quite similar to the way in which the semantic representation (or logical form) of indexical sentences is envisaged in the relevance-theoretic framework I work with, but could be seen as a better worked out version of it than we've had up to now. We've talked in terms of indexicals triggering open slots or place-holders which carry certain constraints with them (as given by the lexical character of the indexical) (see Carston 2002, 60) . It might well be that Borg's thin singular concepts provide a better, more precise, way of thinking about what the decoding of indexicals yields.
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There is a question about how this approach handles cases of descriptively-used indexicals (see Nunberg 1993) , which would seem to have a general rather than a singular content and so map to general concepts in thought. But the more immediate question in the current context is whether this 'content' in which the referent remains unidentified really does constitute genuine full-blooded truth-conditional content or is more akin to the schematic truthconditional template that relevance theorists and other contextualists maintain is the most that we get for sentence-type meaning.
Borg insists that it is fully truth-conditional content and charges those who doubt this with failing to distinguish 'grasping the truth condition for an utterance and being able to verify whether or not that condition is met ' (p.206) . I won't address here the charge of 'creeping verificationism', which she develops more fully in the chapter on covert contextsensitivity, although I think it is quite unwarranted. Instead, let's come at the proposed content for demonstratives in a different way. Suppose you utter 'That's green', then the semantic content (i.e. the truth-conditional content) of your utterance, according to Borg, is [µ is GREEN)], where GREEN is a general concept and µ is a singular concept, but where the object that constitutes the semantic content of that singular concept has not been identified (that being a post-semantic, properly pragmatic matter). It seems to follow that if I, grasping just this semantic content, were presented with an exhaustive array of the green objects in the world, I would not be able to judge whether your utterance was true or false. In what sense, then, can I be said to have grasped the truth-conditional content of your utterance? When Borg goes on, in the next chapter, to defend the 'liberal' truth conditions her account assigns to such sentences as 'Jane can't continue' or to sentences lacking background conditions of normal application, such as 'John cut the sun', her adequacy criterion is that 'the language user who grasps such a liberal truth-condition [is able] to tell worlds in which it is satisfied from worlds in which it is not' (p.235) or, in a slightly weaker version, it should 'serve to make a ruling on a range of clear cases ' (p.238) , but this criterion is not met by the content assigned to demonstrative sentences. So, while I entirely agree with Borg that this is the most we can expect to get from the semantic component of a Fodorian language module, what I remain skeptical about is whether it meets her (Davidsonian) truth-conditional desideratum.
Finally, whether or not Borg has succeeded in her endeavour to establish a modular truthconditional semantics for natural language sentences, there is a more fundamental question, a preliminary question, concerning the truth-conditional desideratum itself. Borg has gone to 9 huge trouble to try to provide us with an intention-free-whilst-still-fully-propositional content for demonstrative (and indexical) utterances. But why is it so darned important that the semantics of a natural language sentence-type (relativized to a formal context) should be a truth-evaluable entity? Borg repeatedly and rightly emphasises the differences between a theory of linguistic meaning and a theory of communication, and what we should and should not expect from each of them. It seems right that we should expect truth-evaluable thoughts (propositions) as the output of communication (and, of course, not just any such but thoughts that are appropriately relevant, informative, etc) -it is these that we agree or disagree with, believe or doubt, hold people to, act on the basis of, etc. -but why should we expect them from a theory of the meanings encoded by sentence-types, meanings which function as multiply reusable tools in communication and are virtually always supplemented, enriched or otherwise adjusted when so used. What purpose(s) would their being propositional (truthevaluable) serve?
Borg does recognize that there is a question here, but does not address it with anything like the intellectual energy given to the indexical/demonstrative issue. It seems to be treated as more or less a given. In the introduction, she briefly mentions two reasons for assuming that the outputs of the formal sentence semantics should be fully propositional: (a) speakers make intuitive judgments that certain sentences express something true (e.g. 'Snow is white') and that others are false (e.g. 'Grass is white'), and (b) we can assess the validity of arguments presented in natural language (p.5). I'm not sure how strong these points are, especially given that Borg also maintains (rightly, in my view) that the outputs of the formal theory are not answerable to intuitive judgments about truth-conditional content ('what is said'). As she puts it, these are 'judgments made at the point of communication' and so depend on 'information located beyond the reach of the language faculty' (p.9). But the same goes for judgments about truth values and validity -even in contexts of utterance where the pragmatic factors are minimized as much as possible, they are never wholly absent. The best argument for the output of semantic processing being propositional would be that this property plays a key role in the overall account of verbal communication and comprehension in which it is lodged. But there is no such argument, since a less than fully propositional output does the job just as well.
To conclude, if you think a minimal, formal, truth-conditional semantics for natural language sentences is something to aspire to, then Borg's account is the one to go for -it's principled and tightly argued, and it tackles head-on the number one issue for any such semantics, the issue of the semantic content of demonstratives and indexicals. If, on the other hand, you doubt that this is the right way to think about sentence semantics, this book is still a mustread, for it provides the best minimalist case yet and so enriches and sharpens the terms of the debate.
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